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Narcotic intoxication, in which the euphoric suspension of the self is expiated by 
deathlike sleep, is one of the oldest social transactions mediating between self-
preservation and self-annihilation, an attempt by the self to survive itself. The fear 
of losing the self, and suspending with it the boundary between oneself and other 
life, the aversion to death and destruction, is twinned with a promise of joy which 
has threatened civilization at every moment. 
Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (2002, 26) 
Introduction 
There is a powerful and dominant tradition in western thought, reaching its peak in the age of 
enlightenment, that considers critique and intoxication as opposing forces.1 Whoever is critical, is 
rational and ‘sober’, and whenever one is intoxicated, be it by love or other drugs, critical capacities 
tend to give way. On the other hand, Pliny the Elder already noted that there is ‘wisdom in wine’, 
and he is just one amongst an alternative, perhaps less powerful but equally persistent, strand of 
thought arguing that there is in fact a deeper, more profound enlightenment to be found in a state 
of intoxication. In this article I want to further investigate this tension between the concepts of 
critique and intoxication. Taking the German philosopher and critic Walter Benjamin as my 
principle guide, I want to analyze the dialectics of critique and intoxication, and explore the 
possibilities of a critical intoxication, and/or an intoxicated critique. What would be the aesthetic 
and socio-political implications for such juxtaposition for both of these categories? 
 222 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 5 (2) (2020) 
To do this, I will start by 1) analyzing the tension between (the concepts of) critique and intoxication 
in further detail, next I will 2) discuss Benjamin’s concept of ‘profane illumination’ and his dialectical 
approach to this tension. I will continue 3) by focusing on the political implications of this concept 
on the basis of Jeremy Gilbert, and next 4) explore the possibility of a ‘critical mass’ by discussing 
Donna Haraway, Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci, specifically looking at the latter’s concept 
of ‘common sense’. I will conclude 5) with some reflections on the notion of Acid Communism by 
the late cultural critic Mark Fisher, which I consider as a promising attempt to bring critique, 
intoxication, and revolutionary politics in line with each other. 
1. Tension between critique and intoxication 
So, what exactly is the tension I am talking about?  We can go as go back as far as Homer’s Odyssey 
to find the urtext of this mode of thought. Odysseus, who as Horkheimer and Adorno already 
argued in many ways epitomizes critical and rational thinking, has to challenge and fight 
intoxicating forces several times on his journey home. The first time is on the island of the Lotus-
eaters, who eat nothing but the intoxicating flowers of the Lotus-plant, and as a result are in a 
continuous state of blissful lethargy. When some men of Odysseus’ crew eat from the Lotus, they 
forget about their mission and have to be dragged back to the ship by force: 
They […] went about among the Lotus-eaters, who did them no hurt, but gave them 
to eat of the lotus, which was so delicious that those who ate of it left off caring 
about home, and did not even want to go back and say what had happened to 
them, but were for staying and munching lotus with the Lotus-eaters without 
thinking further of their return; nevertheless, though they wept bitterly I forced 
them back to the ships and made them fast under the benches. (Homer 1999, book 
IX) 
Another famous scene is when Odysseus’ crew turns into pigs on the island of the sorceress Circe. 
Although here too, it concerns a specific toxic, namely poisoned wine, this scene obviously 
symbolizes first and foremost the intoxication caused by sexual arousal, with the traditional 
gender-stereotype of the irrational woman seducing the rational and goal-oriented man, and 
turning him into a mindless animal. Finally, and perhaps most famous, is the episode with the 
Sirens, wherein Odysseus lets himself be tied to the mast in order to listen to their otherwise 
destructive song. Although the Sirens too are female, the true seduction here is of course the song 
itself, in other words the idea of the intoxication of art, which is considered dangerous for man’s 
critical capacities. Time and again, Odysseus fights intoxicating forces using his critical mind, 
sometimes even using these forces to his own benefit (such as the scene in which he liquors up 
the Cyclops). 
Of this critical attitude towards intoxication we can find numerous examples in the history of 
western thought, from Plato’s rejection of irrational art and the aesthetic experience as a form of 
madness in both Ion and the Republic, to Karl Marx’s characterization of religion as ‘opium of the 
masses’. Even those sympathetic to intoxication, like the French poet Charles Baudelaire in his 
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Artificial Paradises, writes that hashish “like all solitary pleasures, renders the individual useless to 
his fellow man, and society superfluous to the individual” (Baudelaire 1998, 74). 
The final example of Odysseus is also telling because it shows us why intoxication would be 
harmful to critical thinking: it lacks the very distance required of critique. Indeed, whoever is critical 
puts himself at a distance. The very word critique comes from the Greek krino (κρῑ́νω), to separate, 
divide and distinguish, or to judge and decide. For Kant, critical judgment was precisely that, to 
separate, and hence put a distance between right and wrong, sense and nonsense, between 
beauty and ugliness, or between what can be known and what cannot be known. In the German 
ur-teilen (judging, deciding) there still resounds the separation of things, putting them apart (teilen). 
Odysseus also puts things apart: he places himself at safe distance from the threat of the Sirens, 
thus restraining himself and withholding himself from the object of his desire. After all, Odysseus 
survives because he is tied to the mast, and because the ears of his oarsmen are filled with wax so 
that they cannot hear his desperate pleas to untie him, or turn the ship towards the island. His 
survival, in other words, is possible because of his ‘cunning’ (the way Homer characterizes 
Odysseus throughout the Odyssey). His critical, rational self outsmarts his intoxicated self.  
This image of Odysseus as the critical subject who is, however, also tied to the mast can also explain 
why, the other way around, there is a tradition of thinking that values intoxication precisely at the 
expense of critique. The distance that characterizes critique is then rejected, and opposed to the 
immersion, nearness, participation and affirmation that characterizes the intoxicated state. We can 
recognize this in Nietzsche’s attempts to overcome the tradition of western thought, starting with 
Plato and dominant until Kant. The latter, Kant, the critical thinker par excellence, he called in a rant 
in the Antichrist, “a nihilist, with his bowels of Christian dogmatism” because he “regarded pleasure 
as an objection”. “This is the very recipe for decadence”, Nietzsche continues, “and no less for 
idiocy… Kant became an idiot” (Nietzsche 2006, aphorism 11). Philosophers up until Kant had 
divided the world into the sensuous and ephemeral world and an eternal, transcendent world that 
is more real, more true. This, after all, allowed the critical mind not to participate, not to be involved 
in the world, in the flesh, in the Dionysian ecstasy, to become member of a priestly caste that only 
judges, and thereby, in Nietzsche’s view, becomes the ultimate enemy of life itself. The priestly 
caste, as he explains in Genealogy of Morals, praises what is weak and suffering, while deeming 
happiness, joy and strength sinful. In Nietzsche’s view, this is the ultimate form of decadence, 
against which he mobilizes an entire counter-tradition that opposes critique with vitality and life-
affirmation. According to him, we should play and dance, we should consider reality and our 
existence as something exciting and joyful. In other words: we should be drunk with life itself. 
There is a clear resonance of this counter-critical tradition in contemporary philosophical and 
artistic critiques of critique, such as the one by Alain Badiou, although surely not a vitalist, who 
rejected the critical Kantian tradition in favor of affirmation and being ‘true to the Event’ (Badiou 
1999); or by Bruno Latour who in a seminal article argued that ‘critique has run out of steam’ 
(Latour 2004); or in Derrida’s deconstruction, which, as Bernard Stiegler notes, “claims that the 
nucleus of criticism shatters because it equates critical possibility with absolute autonomy, thereby 
excluding the possibility of a relational criticism” (Stiegler 2013, 44). We recognize it, finally, in 
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certain artistic practices such as community and participatory art, which as Claire Bishop has 
argued are often based on a negative view of ‘spectatorship’, of the one who merely watches or 
comments but remains uninvolved (Bishop 2012). Although there are of course great differences 
between these thinkers and arguments, what connects them is the rejection of the ‘outsider’ 
perspective and detached attitude of the critic, which is contrasted to an immersive, involved and 
engaged attitude.  
To summarize: from the perspective of critique, intoxication is dangerous, maddening, irrational, 
and barbaric; from the perspective of intoxication, critique is detached, uninvolved, impotent, and 
life-negating. Now obviously, this is not simply a question of either/or, and indeed throughout 
western history intoxication has accompanied critical rationality as its bad consciousness, or as, in 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s words quoted in the epitaph, “an attempt by the self to survive itself” 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 26). It is precisely this interplay of critique and intoxication that we 
will explore in the following sections. 
2. Profane Illumination 
Perhaps the interplay of critique and intoxication reached its culmination, or its most explicit 
expression, in the nineteenth-century, at least in the popular imagination: each Dr. Jekyll must have 
its Mr. Hyde, the cunning mind of Sherlock Holmes is also addicted to cocaine, and Baudelaire, who 
warned for artificial paradises, also advised us to “always be drunk”. 
Be drunk always. Nothing else matters; there are no other subjects. Not to feel the 
grim weight of Time breaking your backs and bending you double, you must get 
drunk and stay drunk. But drunk on what? Wine, poetry, virtue – the choice is yours. 
Just be drunk. (Baudelaire 2010, 73) 
This brings us to the next question: are intoxication and critique just two souls in the chest of 
western thought, or is it possible to somehow reconcile the two, bring them together? For a 
possible answer I will turn to the philosopher and critic Walter Benjamin, who indeed clearly 
possessed these two souls: on the one hand he had the ambition to become the ‘foremost critic’ 
of Germany (Benjamin 1994, 359), and on the other hand he was also very interested in the 
phenomenon of intoxication. In a series of experiments, he used hashish and documented his 
thoughts and utterances, or let them be documented by others, the so-called Hashish Protocols. 
The results of these intoxicated experiments themselves were, moreover, ambiguous, in 
Benjamin’s view. On the one hand, we can read him feeling fully at one with his body, even moving 
to music (which to a German bourgeois intellectual from an upper-middleclass milieu came as 
quite a shock). He writes about the “loosening of the I”, and the unique time-space experience that 
makes “for anyone who has taken hashish, Versailles […] not too large, nor eternity too long” 
(Benjamin 1999a, 390). On the other hand, he also writes about “the unpleasant feeling of wanting 
simultaneously to be alone and to be with others”:  
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You have the feeling of needing to be alone, so as to give yourself over in deeper 
peace of mind to this ambiguous wink from Nirvana; and at the same time, you 
need the presence of others, like gently shifting relief-figures on the plinth of your 
own throne. (Benjamin 1999a, 86) 
For Benjamin, intoxication was never an end in itself. Rather, what interested him was experience; 
indeed, his entire philosophy can be seen—much like Kant’s for that matter—as a theory of the 
conditions of experience. Unlike Kant, however, Benjamin considered these conditions of 
experience to be profoundly historical. In his view the nineteenth century had witnessed a sudden 
transition from a structure of experience based on tradition and practice to one that was isolated 
and shock-like, from Erfahrung to Erlebnis. The world became disenchanted, our experience 
alienated. Remnants of older forms of experience are still to be found in aesthetic experiences, 
such as Baudelaire’s poetic expressions of what he calls correspondances, 2  or Marcel Proust’s 
recollection of childhood experiences after eating the madeleine cake. These are well-known 
examples; but what they signify for Benjamin is precisely a relation of interdependence and 
reciprocity between world and man, between subject and object; what Benjamin called mimesis 
and what more recently the German sociologist Hartmut Rosa called Resonanz (Rosa 2016). In our 
modern society, however, the world has become silent. Throughout his oeuvre, Benjamin 
mentions several explanations for this, from the emergence of a scientific-rational worldview (what 
Horkheimer and Adorno later called instrumental reason) to the alienation caused by 
industrialization and urbanization. 
Benjamin did not want to be nostalgic for an earlier time; rather the challenge was to ‘redeem’ and 
transform earlier modes of experience. For Benjamin, intoxication was the learning school for an 
alternative mode of experience, which in his essay on surrealism he called “profane illumination.” 
But the true, creative overcoming of religious illumination certainly does not lie in 
narcotics. It resides in a profane illumination, a materialistic, anthropological 
inspiration, to which hashish, opium, or whatever else can give an introductory 
lesson. (Benjamin 1999a, 209) 
Or later: 
the most passionate investigation of the hashish trance will not teach us half as 
much about thinking (which is eminently narcotic) as the profane illumination of 
thinking will teach us about the hashish trance. The reader, the thinker, the loiterer, 
the flaneur, are types of illuminati just as much as the opium eater, the dreamer, 
the ecstatic. And more profane. (216) 
What Benjamin is after in the essay on surrealism, and what he attempts with the notion of profane 
illumination, is no less than a dialectics of intoxication. He admires greatly the way the surrealists 
found intoxication in the profane—in old-fashioned or exotic objects, in everyday cityscapes, in 
word-play—he admired their radical understanding of freedom, as not merely political but also 
spiritual, mental and sexual liberation, and he fully condoned their attempt “to win the energies of 
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intoxication for the revolution” (Benjamin 1999a, 2015). Still, eventually they did not succeed in this, 
and in Benjamin’s view, their failure had two reasons. First, in his view the surrealists remained in 
a dream-world, while the actual goal was, in his view, to wake up. On the Arcades Project he writes: 
Delimitation of the tendency of this project with respect to Aragon: whereas Aragon 
persists within the realm of dream, here the concern is to find the constellation of 
awakening. (Benjamin 1999b, 458) 
Again, for Benjamin intoxication is no end in itself, but rather a learning school for a different mode 
of experience which is thoroughly materialist, not a return to the higher realms of the mind but 
rather, the reverse, a return to materiality, to the physical body, and a farewell of the abstractions 
of the mind. 
Moreover, Benjamin’s problem with the surrealist dream, as well as with synthetic intoxication, is 
that it remains a thoroughly individual experience, just like the correspondances of Baudelaire, or 
the childhood recollection of Proust. They may be remnants of an earlier mode, but on the 
individual level. Indeed, if the point is to “win the energies of intoxication for the revolution” we 
have to think of experience in a collective way. 
3. The intoxicating crowd
This brings us to the next question, concerning the political implications of the dialectic of 
intoxication. Up until now I have not discussed one crucial source of intoxication, which is the 
collective. In his essay on Baudelaire, Benjamin writes how the nineteenth century witnessed the 
birth of the modern metropolis, and therewith of the big city masses. He quotes the famous poem 
À une passante in which the poet catches a glimpse of a woman, falls in love, only to lose sight of 
her immediately because they get pushed into opposite directions by the crowd: he calls this ‘love 
at last sight’, as the poet realizes that the chances of a second encounter in the metropolis are 
close to zero. Benjamin writes: “The crowd is not only the newest asylum of outlaws; it is also the 
latest narcotic for people who have been abandoned” (Benjamin 2003, 31). 
Considering the opposition between critique and intoxication that we started with, one can 
understand how the crowd can be seen as a narcotic or opiate, and indeed has been considered 
as such in a dominant strand of social psychology and philosophy. From the perspective of the 
critical individual, a mass can be a grey, anonymous, and dangerous entity, threatening his very 
existence, by either destroying him or, as The Borg in Star Trek used to say, assimilating him. 
Thinkers who reflected on the horrors of twentieth-century totalitarianism were rightfully 
suspicious of mass movements. Indeed, as Theodor W. Adorno writes in his essay ‘Critique’, 
“whoever criticizes violates the taboo of unity” (Adorno 2005, 283). On the other hand, everyone 
who has ever been in a crowd knows that being part of it can also be joyous, exhilarating, 
unexpected, stimulating; from the perspective of the crowd the critical individual can also be 
considered a passive bystander. Moreover, as Fredric Jameson has argued, the “‘Enlightenment’-
227 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 5 (2) (2020) 
type critiques and ‘demystification’ of belief and committed ideology” has served to clear the 
ground for capitalism’s “unobstructed planning and ‘development’” (Jameson 2007, 43). 
In order to get out of this deadlock we require a different conception of masses, collectives, or 
communities. In his book Common Ground (2014), Jeremy Gilbert discusses the ‘Leviathan Logic’ 
that has been dominant in the modern understanding of collectives, which runs from Hobbes 
onwards, and later can be found in writings of several conservative thinkers, such as Gustave 
LeBon and Ortega Y Gasset. According to Gilbert, this Leviathan logic is characterized by the 
following four assumptions: 
1) an ontological individualism, i.e. the “implicit belief that social relations are not
constitutive of the person and their most fundamental forms of experience” (Gilbert
2014, 31–32).
2) a negative understanding of the social as limiting or constraining the freedom of the
individual
3) a vertical understanding of the group, namely as constituted by singular relationships
of each individual member with the (real or metaphorical) leader
4) a meta-individualist conception of collectives, which has the properties of and acts
like an individual (as illustrated by the famous frontispiece of Hobbes’ Leviathan)
Taken together, these assumptions lead to a conception of the collective as a mere aggregation of 
individuals, while at the same time considering it as essentially hostile to the individual’s autonomy. 
For Gilbert, this logic prevails in contemporary neoliberalism, which takes the individual as “the 
basic unit of human experience” (Gilbert 2014, 38). It is even strategically deployed when neoliberal 
politics considers the individual’s creativity as the main source of production, and individual 
responsibility as the legitimization for cutbacks and austerity. Interestingly, however, Gilbert 
argues that the same Leviathan Logic is in fact present in the left tradition as well, although it is of 
course valued in an entirely different way, such that the power of the group over the singular 
individual is indeed legitimized for the higher good. Soviet Communism too, considered the crowd 
as homogenous and with one will, represented by the party, and this logic still pervades in 
contemporary left-wing notions of populism of Laclau and Mouffe, where individuals gather under 
the ‘empty signifier’ that is ‘the people’ (Gilbert 2014, 57). 
According to Gilbert, the main contemporary political challenge is to conceive of a different 
understanding of collectives, neither as disorganized rabble nor as totalitarian meta-individual, but 
rather “as a condition of dynamic multiplicity and complex creativity” (Gilbert 2014, x). This he finds 
in the concept of the Spinozean ‘multitude’, which has of course been further elaborated by Paolo 
Virno, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. The multitude, in this understanding is: 
a creative collectivity capable of exercising political agency; but [which] is neither 
composed of individuals nor itself constitutes a meta-individual. It is rather a 
potentially infinite network of singularities. (98) 
The concept of the multitude—also in the work of Hardt and Negri—remains quite vague. It poses, 
most of all, a challenge, to think of the collective and the individual not as opposing and mutually 
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excluding forces, but rather to think in terms of a productive and fruitful interrelationship between 
the two. And, coming back to the issue of intoxication, can we think of a collective that is both 
powerful and productive, and at the same time critical, self-critical and open for dissenting voices. 
In other words: what would a ‘critical mass’ look like? 
4. Towards a critical mass?
I want to emphasize that this is not a merely academic issue, but a social and political one. We are 
living in an era of mass movements and mass protests. Only during the last months, we’ve 
witnessed numerous climate marches, women’s marches, worker’s protests, and uprisings in Chile, 
Lebanon and Hong Kong. These are movements emerging from the assembly and aggregation of 
critical individuals, and they in turn raise awareness and a critical attitude amongst the rest of the 
population. At the same time, we hear critique of such protests: that they are disorganized, 
uninformed, misdirected, hysterical or irrational. And this is not only critique coming from right-
wing or conservative commentators; think of Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams’ critique of ‘folk 
politics’, their term for the bad and unproductive romanticization of immediate and direct action 
at the expense of long-term strategy, the critical study of new ideas, and ‘the long march through 
the institutions’ (Srnicek and Williams 2015). 
Indeed, we should not step into the pitfall of romanticizing the mass per se. Next to all the protests 
just mentioned, and next to Occupy, Extinction Rebellion and Arab Springs, we have in recent years 
also witnessed white supremacists marching in Charlottesville, and Polish far-right nationalists, or 
collectives more difficult to position on either side of the political spectrum such as the yellow 
vests. Which again raises the question that, if we take the crowd as a form of intoxication, how 
should we think of its relation to critique, and to critical consciousness? Can we think of a critical 
intoxication, or an intoxicated critique? 
For a hint of an answer, let us turn to Benjamin one last time. In the essay on surrealism, Benjamin 
concludes in the following way: 
The collective is a body, too. And the physis that is being organized for it in 
technology [Technik] can, through all its political and factual reality, be produced 
only in that image space to which profane illumination initiates us. Only when in 
technology body and image space so interpenetrate that all revolutionary tension 
becomes bodily collective innervation, and all the bodily innervations of the 
collective become revolutionary discharge, has reality transcended itself to the 
extent demanded by the Communist Manifesto. (Benjamin 1999a, 217–218) 
This is a rather enigmatic passage, so we should try to unpack it. Profane illumination, Benjamin 
says, creates an image space, which, if it comes together with the body space of the collective, can 
lead to the revolutionary discharge. What that means, in my view, is that the collective or mass can 
only become a proper mass movement at the moment that it recognizes itself as a collective. In 
other words: the mass always needs to perform itself, and this performance cannot be 
spontaneous but must be consciously prepared, indeed is a matter of ‘technique’ (Technik). The 
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‘image space’, is, in other words, the result of a critical strategy. This calls to mind Friedrich Engels’ 
concept of ‘class consciousness’ (Klassenbewusstsein), though what Benjamin has in mind seems to 
be slightly different, or at least an addition to this concept; not merely a discursive practice, but 
also an aesthetic and bodily practice. Indeed, Technik here cannot simply be translated as 
‘technology’, as the translators have it; the German word, at least in the way Benjamin uses it, also 
refers to artistic, or rather aesthetic techniques (Lijster 2017, 92). Referring back to some of the 
earlier mentioned examples, we can think of the yellow vests, or the umbrellas of the protesters in 
Hong Kong, or the ‘pussy hats’ of the participants in the Women’s March. Indeed, the very gathering 
of bodies in the streets, turning into a collective body moving through the streets, already 
contributes to the self-recognition and thereby empowering of the collective. 
However, this self-identification should never be total, if the mass is still to remain critical. 
Otherwise, we risk relapsing in traditional notions of ‘the people’ or ‘the community’, governed by 
the Leviathan Logic that Gilbert was talking about.3 In contrast, what we here call ‘critical mass’ is 
precisely characterized by the possibility of self-criticism, dissensus, and the potential of 
transformation. In fact, as Benjamin also noted, the main characteristic of fascism is precisely that 
it creates a merely aesthetic image of the ‘people’, without changing anything in the relations of 
production. 
For our question concerning a critical intoxication or intoxicated critique, this entails a double 
movement, wherein our understanding of both critique and intoxication are expanded and 
adjusted. The notion of critique discussed in the first part, as detached and distanced, needs to be 
rethought, namely as embodied and contextualized. Following Donna Haraway and other feminist 
scholars, we should think of critique as emerging from ‘situated knowledge’ (Haraway 1988). 
Indeed, critical and rational consciousness has long pretended to be a kind of view from nowhere, 
but as Haraway remarks, “knowledge from the point of view of the unmarked is truly fantastic, 
distorted, and irrational” (Haraway 1988, 587). Critique, then, is always situated, but this does not 
mean that it necessarily resigns itself to this situation. Michel Foucault famously defined critique 
as “the art of not being governed like that’” that is not “in the name of those principles, with such 
and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by 
them” (Foucault 2007, 44). The ‘like that’ in this phrase is crucial, for it excludes from the outset the 
very possibility of not being governed at all, and therefore radically situates and historicizes 
critique. For Foucault, critique is not something that was invented by philosophers in the 
eighteenth century, and does come out of nowhere, but is an attitude that exists and has existed 
everywhere and every time that people revolted against certain (historical and situated) modes of 
governmentality. Interestingly, Foucault mentions mysticism as one of the earliest forms of this 
revolt (namely against the authority of the church) in the West, which brings his understanding of 
critique in close proximity to Benjamin’s ‘profane illumination’: both mobilize the power of 
experience against the rules of law and dogma. And like Benjamin, Foucault underlines the supra-
individual side to critique; he talks about critique as “both an individual and collective attitude” with 
the ultimate aim to “get out of one’s minority” (Foucault 2007, 67, emphasis mine). 
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So how does one ‘get out of one’s minority’? To answer that question, we should again consider 
critique in its relation to the collective. A good point of departure could be Antonio Gramsci’s notion 
of ‘common sense’, which he defines as “the diffuse, uncoordinated features of a generic form of 
thought common to a particular period and a particular popular environment” (Gramsci 1971, 330). 
While Marx argued that the ideological ‘superstructure’ emerges naturally from the class that ruled 
over the means of production, for Gramsci it was less one-dimensional than that. Common sense, 
for Gramsci, is rather an arena of continuously contested and contesting ideas about what the 
world is like, and what is considered possible, necessary, realistic, etcetera. Ideological rule does 
not follow automatically from economic rule, but is rather the outcome of a struggle in which the 
ruling classes eventually gain hegemony over the definition of reality. Thus, for Gramsci it will not 
suffice for the suppressed classes to cease the economic means of production; the struggle to 
create a different hegemonic order, that is to define what is ‘common sense’, is also fought through 
cultural, educational and media institutions. Each political struggle, then, has to start with 
challenging and altering common sense. The way to do this, Gramsci argues, is not to start from 
scratch, but rather exists in “making ‘critical’ an already existing activity” (Gramsci 1971, 331). This 
implies that one starts from values and beliefs already acknowledged by a collective (such as 
‘freedom’, ‘equality’ or even ‘the common’ itself), only to slightly shift them into a different direction. 
Following Gramsci, Christian Höller thus talked about ‘uncommon sense’, and considered the task 
of critique twofold: “to acknowledge the un-common element in the common, and to start building 
a new common on the basis of such un-common elements” (Höller 2015, 107). 
On the level of strategy, Gramsci urges his reader: 
To work incessantly to raise the intellectual level of ever-growing strata of the 
populace, in other words, to give a personality to the amorphous mass element. 
This means working to produce élites of intellectuals of a new type which arise 
directly out of the masses, but remain in contact with them to become, as it were, 
the whalebone in the corset. (Gramsci 1971, 340) 
Aside from the problematic metaphor, Gramsci’s reference to ‘elites’ may seem to conflict with our 
concerns here. But although he suggests that “the culmination of this process can be a great 
individual philosopher” (Ibid.), we should keep in mind that in his view all people are potentially and 
principally philosophers and/or intellectuals, so that this process could indeed result in what I’ve 
called a critical mass.  
Out of the preceding paragraphs an image emerges of a double dialectic, of intoxication and of 
critique. The first is the dialectic of intoxication we already discussed on the basis of Benjamin’s 
critique of surrealism and his concept of profane illumination: a form of intoxication infused with 
a collective, and indeed critical element. Conversely, the second dialectic of critique entails the idea 
that critique should be ‘situated’, that is embodied, and if you will ‘intoxicated’, by the crowd, which 
however cannot mean that it puts itself entirely in the service of it. After all, that would be precisely 
the unjustified romanticizing of the ‘wisdom of crowds’, while the very purpose of critique is to 
acknowledge the uncommon in ‘common sense’, and to build further on it. 
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So finally, what would it mean for critique to be intoxicated, or itself be intoxicating. To start with 
the first, I believe the ‘outsider’-perspective or position of the critic is indeed unattainable today, if 
it ever was possible in the first place. Still, one might think of this position as an as-if position, again 
as a performance: although we know there’s no outside view, we might still act as if there is one. In 
that regard, one might compare philosophical critique with the famous artwork by Pierro Manzoni, 
of the pedestal of the world: not only does Manzoni make the entire world a ready-made artwork, 
but he also acts as if his pedestal is the only thing not belonging to that world (since a pedestal 
traditionally was not part of the artwork) (Lijster 2016). Only by imagining such a place beyond the 
world, such an imaginative place, one could start thinking of a different world, and indeed argue 
that in fact there are alternatives. This seems to contrast with the idea of working with and through 
the common sense; but what I have in mind is not some otherworldly utopia, but rather the simple 
act of imagining the world different than it is—moving from TINA (There Is No Alternative) to 
TAMARA (There Are Many And Real Alternatives). This is precisely what the hegemonic struggle 
over the creation a new ‘common sense’ is all about, and this struggle, as Gramsci already argued, 
does not and cannot only take place on the streets, but should also take place in schools, 
universities, media, and institutions. 
On the other hand, this new common sense can only be built by questioning the current common 
sense. Thus understood, critique can indeed be seen as a ‘toxin’ injected in the body of the 
common, leading to an altered state of mind of the collective. This then, might precisely be what 
an intoxicated and intoxicating critique might look like: intoxicated by the collective and common 
will for change, critique needs to take a stance, to position, commit and engage itself. Thus, by 
starting to build a new common sense and by inventing new futures, it can intoxicate future 
generations with the belief that another world is possible. 
Figure 1. Piero Manzoni, Socle du Monde (1961). HEART, Herning Museum of Contemporary Art. 
Photograph: Ole Bagger 
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5. Postscript on Acid Communism 
Undoubtedly, the most damaging and dangerous toxic in our contemporary world is capitalism 
itself, which is harming and killing people across the globe, poisoning our minds, and is destroying 
the very planet we are living on. Indeed, as Slavoj Žižek notes, “the threat is that we will be reduced 
to abstract subjects devoid of all substantial content, dispossessed of our symbolic substance, our 
genetic base heavily manipulated, vegetating in an unlivable environment” (Žižek 2009, 92). In this 
situation, critique is a vital antidote, which is to be injected into the common sense. Or perhaps we 
should, following Bernard Stiegler, consider it as a pharmakon, namely something that can be both 
a remedy and a toxin (Stiegler 2013). After all, critique can also have an unforeseen negative effect, 
as was for instance argued by Boltanksi and Chiapello who showed how the ‘new spirit of 
capitalism’ emerged from a co-optation of the ‘artistic critiques’ of the 1960s (demanding more 
autonomy, flexibility and authenticity) at the expense of ‘social critique’ (revolving around equality 
and redistribution) (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). This is precisely what the dialectics of critique 
and intoxication described above entails: that both critique and intoxication have a subversive and 
a conformist potential. The point and the challenge is to bring them together in such a way that 
the subversive potential is fully actualized. 
In the final texts written before his untimely death, cultural critic Mark Fisher coined the term Acid 
Communism. Inspired by the ‘psychedelic socialism’ of his friend Jeremy Gilbert, and returning to 
the countercultural utopian politics of the 1960s and 1970s, the adjective ‘acid’ obviously refers to 
psychedelic drugs. However, Fisher’s point was not to romanticize the hippie-generation: 
The concept of acid communism is a provocation and a promise. It is a joke of sorts, 
but one with very serious purpose. It points to something that, at one point seemed 
inevitable, but which now appears impossible: the convergence of class 
consciousness, socialist-feminist consciousness-raising and psychedelic 
consciousness, the fusion of new social movements with a communist project, an 
unprecedented aestheticisation of everyday life. (Fisher 2018, 757–758) 
Indeed, this promise of Acid Communism is one that has been forgotten, ignored or suppressed 
ever since. While the hippies themselves turned their backs on society in the course of the 1970s 
(‘socialism in one person’, as film maker Adam Curtis once waspishly called it), left politics turned 
into ‘third way’ social-democracy, which meant a shaking of ideological feathers and a capitulation 
to a neoliberal worldview. It led to what Fisher in one of his other seminal texts called ‘capitalist 
realism’ (Fisher 2009), the belief that there is no reasonable alternative to the neoliberal capitalist 
organization of society. 
Acid Communism was Fisher’s (unfortunately unfinished and thus not fully worked out) answer to 
capitalist realism. What would it mean to take serious once again the promises of the 1960s? 
Obviously, this would entail a head-on attack on neoliberalism. But clearly, acid communism is not 
merely directed at capitalism, but equally so at the several factions within the left, which today tend 
to either take in a conservative stance of romanticizing a pre-war or 1950s welfare state model 
(thereby neglecting the privileging of certain groups within that model) or one-sidedly focuses on 
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the cultural battle of suppressed minorities. The ‘acid’ in Acid Communism emphasizes that, in 
order to change things, it will neither suffice to redistribute the planet’s resources in a more equal 
way, nor to grant equal rights within the existing economic system. An entirely different way of 
living, and hence of thinking, will be necessary, to depart from the individualist consumer model 
and the dictatorship of productivity that feed of our desires and wreaks havoc on earth. 
This is where the subversive sides of critique and intoxication meet. Both of them denaturalize the 
world: critique by placing us at a distance from the present one, intoxication by immersing us in a 
different world. Both critique and intoxication point the individual beyond itself, towards 
something other or larger than itself. This is highly necessary in a world order that primarily 
addresses us as individuals, either as individual desiring consumers, or responsible and productive 
laborers. The dialectic of critique and intoxication is thus a first conceptual step towards a further 
alignment of consciousness-raising in both the spiritual and the social-political sense. Together, 
they can show, as Gilbert writes, “that the liberation of human consciousness from the norms 
of capitalist society is a desirable, achievable and pleasurable objective” (Gilbert 2017).
Notes 
1 I want to express my gratitude to the editorial board of Performance Philosophy and to the two anonymous 
reviewers for their helpful suggestions. 
2 Such as in the poem with the same name: “Nature is a temple in which living pillars / Sometimes give voice to 
confused words; / Man passes there through forests of symbols / Which look at him with understanding eyes.”  
3 Gilbert (2014) makes the useful distinction between ‘community’ and ‘common’. While the first is “dependent 
upon a shared, but static and homogeneous identity, and that it is often evoked in order to neutralise any possible 
criticism of the power relations obtaining within ‘communities’” (164), the latter “can be understood as that domain 
of creative potential which is constituted by, and constitutive of, sociality as such” (167). He continues: “In fact we 
might suggest that the common emerges precisely at the point where the preindividual becomes the 
transindividual, where the potentiality inherent in the sociality of social relations becomes the real creative 
potential of those relations as they are enacted and actualised in the present” (167). 
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